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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines debates over the meaning of "free labor" in nineteenth
century Hawaii. It argues that "free labor" was a sufficiently expansive concept
that American missionaries and settlers intent on introducing "free labor" to
Hawaii as part of their "civilizing" mission actually laid the foundations for sugar
plantation agriculture, which had historically been associated with enslaved labor
elsewhere in the world. The malleability of "free labor" as a concept allowed
Hawaii's sugar planters to defend Hawaii's labor system against accusations of
using unfree labor. It also justified state intervention by the Hawaiian government
for schemes to import East Asian indentured labor for the plantations. Ironically,
although Americans had created Hawaii's indentured labor system, the American
annexation of Hawaii in 1898 resulted in the end of this system. This paper
argues that this development resulted from the imposition of a different definition
of "free labor," which had developed on the mainland in tandem with the
movement for Asian exclusion, which viewed Asian migrants as unfree "coolies."
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This thesis is about two ironies in the history of 19th century Hawaii. First,
American settlers, most of them Northerners, including antislavery missionaries, saw
themselves as redeeming the Hawaiian people from the tyranny of Hawaii’s system of
rule by chiefs, but they recreated Hawaii as a plantation society, whose main crop was
sugar and whose labor was overwhelmingly indentured and unfree. The second irony is
that the system of indentured or “coolie” labor created by Americans came to an end as a
result of the United States’ annexation of Hawaii. For all the other problems that came
with the expansion of empire, it brought an end to the system of unfree labor that anti
slavery missionaries had wrought.
This paper examines how debates over labor in Hawaii, which were inextricably
tied to debates over labor migration, shaped relations between Hawaii and the United
States. These debates began at least as early as the 1850s, when American
Congregationalist missionaries and a few British and American lawyers and businessmen
(known in colloquial Hawaiian, like white foreigners generally, as haoles) began to exert
disproportionate influence on the Hawaiian monarchy. They continued through the
creation of a plantation system, and reemerged with a vengeance on the eve of American
annexation. What did free labor and slavery mean in these newly acquired provinces of
American empire?
Most of the historiography on Hawaii, America, and annexation tends to
emphasize American empire. To some extent, this emphasis mirrors the concerns of
contemporaries and the availability of sources. Because the annexation of Hawaii
happened in the context of the Spanish-American War in 1898, larger questions of
American imperialism generally tend to obscure other concerns. Issues like Americans’
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own rationalization of their “aberrational burst of conventional colonial rule,” or the
geopolitical desirability of acquiring one of the most strategically important ports in the
Pacific at Pearl Harbor were important dimensions of the story of American empire in
Hawaii.1 But examining the Hawaiian-American relationship through the lens of evolving
ideas about labor illuminates the ideological context of annexation.2 As Paul Kramer
points out in a 2011 review essay, “imperial histories” of America in the world have the
potential to encompass a much broader range of issues, provided they can “move to the
side the mostly unproductive question of whether the United States is or has ‘an
empire.’”3 In Hawaii’s case, examining the interplay between evolving American
anxieties about labor and the processes of Americanization and annexation points to the
specific consequences of American expansion.4
This paper argues that the history of labor in Hawaii needs to be integrated into a
growing historiography on the global history of the “coolie trade.” The American Empire
is not the only empire at play here. While other scholars have examined the rise of
“coolies” in the British Empire, the Caribbean, and the mainland United States, little
research places Hawaii within these broader conversations about coolies and the

1 Paul Kramer, “Power and Connection: Imperial Histories o f the United States and the World,” Am erican
H istorical R eview 116, no. 5 (December, 2011), 1372; Thomas J. Osborne, “Trade or War? America’s
Annexation o f Hawaii Reconsidered,” P acific H istorical R eview 50, no. 3 (August, 1981), 285-307.
2 One somewhat dated piece does provide a sparse outline o f the interplay o f the contract labor issue and
U .S.-Hawaiian relations, but makes little reference to ideology. Donald Rowland, “The United States and
the Contract Labor Question in Hawaii, 1862-1900,” Pacific H istorical Review 2, no. 3 (September, 1933),
249-269.
3 Paul Kramer, “Power and Connection,” 1350.
4 Examples o f existing works that touch only slightly on the role o f labor issues in the lead-up to American
annexation o f Hawaii include Merze Tate, The U nited States and the H awaiian Kingdom: A P olitical
H istory (N ew Haven, 1965) and Thomas J. Osborne, “Em pire Can W ait”: Am erican O pposition to
H aw aiian Annexation, 1893-1898 (Kent, Ohio, 1981). Tate’s second book on U.S.-Hawaiian relations does
make a few references to the coolie issue and the rhetoric o f free labor surrounding it, but still focuses
m ainly on commercial questions surrounding the U.S. sugar industry. See Merze Tate, Hawaii: R eciprocity
or Annexation (East Lansing, Mich., 1968), 141-142, 149-150, 246, 248.
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aftermath of slavery.5 It also argues that the history of labor in Hawaii needs to be
integrated into the already voluminous historiography of American slavery.6 The
migration of laborers into Hawaii during the sugar boom took place in the context of
American anxieties about the persistence of unfree forms of labor after the Thirteenth
Amendment, particularly the reviled “coolie trade” in the Pacific Ocean basin.
Historians of Hawaii have uncovered many of the components of the story of
labor migration to the islands, but these studies tend to remain within the bailiwick of
Hawaiian history or the history of specific ethnic groups. Ralph Simpson Kuykendall’s
three volume narrative synthesis, The Hawaiian Kingdom, published in 1938, 1954, and
1967, remains the standard work on nineteenth-century Hawaii, and offers a useful
narrative outline of Hawaii’s nineteenth-century history of labor importation. However,
Kuykendall did not spend significant time exploring the tension between free-labor ideals
and anxieties about “coolies.”7 The standard labor history of Hawaii, Edward D.
Beechert’s Working in Hawaii: A Labor History (1985), provides a good survey of
Hawaiian labor history, but does not delve deeply into the ideological backdrop of
contract labor or debates about the legitimacy of importing “coolies.”8 Another subfield,
consisting of studies of specific ethnic groups within Hawaii’s immigration history, also
addresses issues relevant to the issue of “coolies” and transnational ideas about free and

5 Madhavi Kale, Fragm ents o f Em pire: Capital, Slavery, and Indentured L abor in the British Caribbean
(Philadelphia, 2010).
6 David Northrup, “Free and Unfree Labor Migration, 1600-1900: An Introduction,” Journal o f World
H istory 14, no. 2 (June, 2003), 125-130; Matthew Pratt Guterl, “After Slavery: Asian Labor, the American
South, and the A ge o f Emancipation,” Journal o f W orld H istory 14, no. 2 (June, 2003), 209-241; David
Eltis, ed., C oerced an d Free M igrations: G lobal P erspectives (Stanford, 2004).
7 Ralph S. Kuykendall, The H aw aiian Kingdom, Volume I: 1778-1854, Foundation an d Transformation
(Honolulu, 1938); Ralph S. Kuykendall, The H aw aiian Kingdom, Volume II: 1854-1874, Twenty C ritical
Years (Honolulu, 1954); Ralph S. Kuykendall, The H awaiian Kingdom, Volume III: 1874-1893, The
K alakaua D ynasty (Honolulu, 1967).
8 Edward D. Beechert, Working in H aw aii: A Labor H istory (Honolulu, 1985).
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unfree labor without drawing on those connections specifically. In Pau Hana: Plantation
Life and Labor in Hawaii, 1835-1920 (1983), for example, Ronald Takaki places
Japanese migrants at the center of his story. Takaki provides a rich portrait of the lived
experiences of plantation workers, but largely leaves out debates over the meaning of
their presence.9
I am not the first historian to suggest a connection between African slavery in the
US South and Hawaiian history. In a fascinating review of Takaki’s book, Alexander
Saxton reads Pau Hana in light of ideas about labor emanating from the nineteenthcentury United States, suggesting connections between Hawaii and the slaveholding
South. He implies that Takaki’s subtitle is a nod to Ulrich B. Philips’s controversial Life
and Labor in the Old South (1929), a connection that Takaki does not explicitly make in
the book itself. Saxton goes on to spell out the implications. Speaking of Hawaii and the
antebellum South, he writes:

Both were plantation colonies dominated by narrow ruling classes which enjoyed
with respect to their labor relations monopolized access to government power.
Both rested on single-crop, export agricultures employing racially-differentiated
and enslaved - or partially unfree - labor. Takaki makes clear from the outset,
however, that differences between these two plantation societies are no less
significant than their similarities. Sugar culture in Hawaii was a product of the
post-Civil War Republican era. Its founders were New England entrepreneurs
whose economic and ideological intent had been, not to enslave, but to enlighten
and set free: market relations and wage labor were to comprise the new
Prometheus.10

9 Ronald Takaki, Pau Hana: Plantation Life an d Labor in Hawaii, 1835-1920 (Honolulu, 1983).
10 Alexander Saxton, “The Making o f the Hawaiian Working Class,” review o f Pau Hana: Plantation Life
an d L abor in Hawaii, 1835-1920 by Ronald Takaki, R eviews in Am erican H istory 12, no. 3 (September,
1984), 414.
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Takaki only touches on this connection. In a short passage, William Hooper, the
impatient master of the Koloa sugar plantation, criticized the “laziness” of his native
Hawaiian workers in the 1840s. He points out, for example, that Hooper put the
responsibility for making “free labor” work on his employees: because of native laziness,
“as long as the plantation depended on native labor, the superintendent would have to be
a ‘Slave Driver.’” 11 In a single sentence, Takaki points out that Hooper saw himself as “a
pathfinder or vanguard of civilization, introducing the system of free labor in order to
emancipate the natives from the miserable system of ‘chief labor.’” 12 After this passage,
discussions of ideologies of freedom and slavery fade from Pau Hana. However
tangential to Takaki’s book, Saxton’s point gets at a central point of tension in the history
of Hawaii. This paper builds on Saxton’s insight and argues that the tension between
freedom and slavery was central to Hawaii’s formation.
Looking more explicitly at this seeming contradiction between the stated freelabor values of early white settlers in Hawaii and the plantation economy they created
demonstrates the malleability of antislavery thought. As Richard Huzzey has shown for
the British Empire, antislavery did not end with the abolition of slavery in 1834, and
Britain’s efforts to suppress the slave trade ultimately came to justify British colonization
of much of the African continent.13 Antislavery ideas likewise had consequences beyond
emancipation in Hawaii and the United States. In the more familiar context of the United
States, the growing political importance of antislavery ideas sparked the Civil War and
shaped the process and aftermath of emancipation. Ironically, in Hawaii many antislavery
ideas provided convenient justifications for the appropriation of native lands and the
11 Takaki, P au Hana, 11.
12 Takaki, Pau Hana, 6.
13 Richard Huzzey, F reedom Burning: A nti-Slavery an d Em pire in Victorian Britain (Ithaca, 2012).
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redeployment of Hawaiian state resources in favor of plantation labor. For example, the
Great Mahele that The Friend extolled as a triumph of free labor was not the victory for
free native farmers it claimed, but rather a land grab that allowed a small white minority
to create profitable sugar cultivation. Supporters of the importation of indentured labor
couched their arguments in antislavery language, even as they pressed for the
introduction of unfree labor and called coolies elsewhere “slaves.”
White Hawaiian ideas about “free labor” were constantly in conversation with
those of their mainland counterparts. These connections resurfaced as the two countries
developed increasing economic and political ties over the course of the nineteenth
century, which culminated in the overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy in 1893 and
American annexation in 1898. Antislavery and “free labor” rhetoric appeared in a range
of contexts. The first waves of Congregationalist missionaries invoked free labor as a
component of their civilizing mission in Hawaii. In practice, this meant both an emphasis
on egalitarianism (in contrast to the “feudalism” of traditional Hawaiian society) and a
desire to reshape native habits, which the missionaries considered indolent and
inappropriate for free laborers. As haole influence increased, American ideological
influence contributed to both the constitutional abolition of slavery and the creation of
legal foundations for the plantation system. Despite protests from both Hawaii and the
United States, Asian contract labor came to supply the bulk of Hawaii’s plantation
workforce, especially after the Hawaiian-American reciprocity treaty of 1876 expanded
the sugar economy. These protests slowed in the 1870s and 1880s, but reemerged in the
midst of debates over American annexation in the 1890s, which looked increasingly
probable after white elites overthrew the monarchy in an 1893 coup. By the time
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Congress set up a territorial government for Hawaii with the Hawaii Organic Act of
1900, the terms of debate had shifted. “Free labor” and antislavery rhetoric no longer
referred primarily to the civilizing or humanitarian mission of the early missionaries or
the more idealistic mid-nineteenth-century antislavery politicians. Instead, these terms
surfaced more often in the context of defending free white American workers from unfair
unfree competition.
The early history of Hawaiian-western interactions set the stage for the rise of the
plantation economy. Before European contact, an aristocratic kin group, the ali 7, had
directed agricultural production through collective taxation on local communities of
agriculturalists. A complex system of social taboos, the kapu system, lent religious
justification to this system by accentuating the separation between nobles and
commoners. As Edward Beechert puts it, “the system of taboos had provided the means
by which the a li’i class was differentiated from the commoner class.” 14
The market pressures that arrived with western ships after Captain James Cook’s
arrival in 1778, however, encouraged many a li’i to redirect labor away from traditional
taro farming toward more profitable, export-oriented activities, especially sandalwood
collection. Although the native Kamehameha dynasty, whose founder Kamehameha I
completed the political unification of Hawaii in 1810 using European weapons, retained
sovereignty in the islands until 1893, Hawaii’s relatively sudden integration into the
global economy caused major disruptions. Sandalwood, a shrub popular among Chinese
merchants in Canton as a source of incense and a material for constructing decorative
boxes, grew abundantly in the islands. Using his ultimate authority over Hawaiian land to
assert a personal monopoly on the trade, Kamehameha I eagerly reassigned Hawaiian
14 Beechert, Working in Hawaii, 14.

workers away from fishing and cultivating taro (the staple crop of the Hawaiian diet) to
gathering sandalwood. Despite his short-term windfall in trade goods from British and
New England merchants hungry for anything to sell in China, Kamehameha had to
rethink his priorities and scale back sandalwood collection when the resulting shortage of
food producers triggered a famine. This temporary slowdown did not continue after the
king’s death in 1819. His successor, Kamehameha II, allowed local chiefs to enter the
trade without royal supervision, and the chiefs escalated production to levels that
depleted wild sandalwood populations so much that the industry collapsed in the 1830s.15
Growing commercial connections with the wider world went well beyond the
collection of sandalwood. Hawaii’s central location in the Pacific Ocean quickly made it
a frequent destination on long-distance shipping routes. In their bid for American
diplomatic recognition, Hawaiian diplomats William Richards and Timoteo Ha’alilio
called it “the great centre of the whale fishery for most of the world.” 16 Between 1820
and 1840, Honolulu and Lahaina became two of the Pacific’s busiest whaling ports, with
Honolulu repeatedly hosting over 100 whaling ships per year.17 Large numbers of sailors
from the whaling fleets arrived in these towns in the midst of the political and social
turmoil surrounding Kamehameha’s death in 1819. The result was the rampant
prostitution that sprang up in Honolulu and Lahaina to meet the demands of the whaling
crews. After converting to Christianity under the influence of New England missionaries,
Hawaii’s ruling class tried in vain to stop prostitution. On at least two occasions, these

15 Ralph S. Kuykendall, “Early Hawaiian Commercial D evelopm ent,” P acific H istorical R eview 3, no. 4
(Decem ber, 1934), 365-385.
16 W illiam Richards and Timoteo Haalilio to the Secretary o f State [Daniel Webster], December 14, 1842,
420.H .R . D oc.35, 5
17 Rhys Richards, “Pacific Whaling 1820 to 1840: Port Visits, ‘Shipping Arrivals and Departures’
Comparisons, and Sources,” The G reat C ircle 24, no. 1 (2002), 27.
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tensions boiled over into violence. In 1826 sailors from the Dolphin smashed windows at
Honolulu mission house and threatened missionary leader Hiram Bingham with clubs to
protest a law banning prostitutes on ships. In 1827 the crew of the British whaler John
Palmer bombarded Lahaina when the Governor of Maui arrested their captain for
violating the same law.18 Native prostitutes were not the only laborers that the whaling
ships demanded. Faced with frequent desertions of disgruntled crew members, whaling
ships took on hundreds of Hawaiian sailors before 1820, and by 1850, more than 4,000
Hawaiian men were serving on European and American ships.19
The demographic consequences of these early interactions were catastrophic.
European and American ships brought an unfamiliar cocktail of diseases to the islands
that killed Hawaiians at rates reminiscent of the epidemics the swept the Americas after
1492. Like their mainland counterparts, native Hawaiians had no previous experience
with smallpox, typhoid fever, tuberculosis, bubonic plague, influenza, dysentery,
measles, or cholera - all of which played a role in the dramatic population drop after
1778.20 Unlike the native inhabitants of the Americas, they also had no previous exposure
to syphilis, which spread quickly in the context of widespread sexual contact between
native women and foreign sailors, and exacerbated the demographic crisis by reducing
fertility. As Seth Archer points out, American missionaries in Hawaii lacked the
resources to develop a medical infrastructure like the United States was beginning to
develop to contain the effects of smallpox, and made things worse by approaching the

18 Sarah V ow ell, Unfamiliar Fishes (N ew York, 2011), 114-116; Jennifer Fish Kashay, “Competing
Imperialisms and Hawaiian Authority: The Cannonading o f Lahaina in 1827,” Pacific H istorical Review
77, no. 3 (August, 2008), 369-390.
19 O.A. Bushnell, The Gifts o f C ivilization: G erm s an d G enocide in H aw aii (Honolulu, 1993), 211.
20 Bushnell, 29.
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problem with fatalistic detachment. “In the end,” he writes, “they laid the blame for
Hawaiian morbidity and depopulation on Hawaiians’ own ‘licentiousness.’”21
Most estimates place the Hawaiian population on the eve of contact in 1778
around 300,000. The first official census, conducted in 1853, counted only 71,019 native
Hawaiians. One analysis of population counts by missionaries in the period 1823-1836
shows a twenty percent population decline, with a 13.2% decline between 1832 and 1836
alone. The 107,954 Hawaiians missionaries counted in 1836 suggest a death rate well
above 50% for the first 60 years of contact with westerners. The native population
stabilized somewhat around the mid-nineteenth century, with an annual rate of decline
between 1% and 2% after 1853, but the remaining indigenous population of 31,019 in
1896 points to a total drop of around 90% between contact and American annexation.22
Like the sugar planters of Trinidad and British Guiana, who used discourses of
“labor shortage” to justify the importation of South Asian indentured workers to compete
with a stable existing population of freed slaves, Hawaiian planters complained
constantly about not having enough workers. Unlike their counterparts in the British
Caribbean, who presided over a declining industry with a large pool of local labor
available, however, Hawaii’s planters could point to the rapid expansion of their industry
and the demographic free fall of the native population.23
In 1820, in the midst of this social turmoil, a small party of New England
Congregationalist missionaries arrived on the Big Island in the brig Thaddeus. They

21 Seth Archer, “Remedial Agents: M issionary Physicians and the Depopulation o f Hawai’i,” Pacific
H istorical R eview 79, no. 4 (November, 2010), 515.
22 Andrew W. Lind, H a w a ii’s P eople (Honolulu, 1967), 16-17; Robert C. Schmitt, D em ographic Statistics
o f Hawaii, 1778-1965 (Honolulu, 1968), 74. The 1896 figure rises to 39,504 when people o f partial native
Hawaiian descent are included.
23 For discourses o f “labor shortage” as a justification for indentured migration in the post-emancipation
British Caribbean, see Kale, Fragm ents o f Empire.
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arrived at almost the exact moment when the social system organized by kapus collapsed.
In 1819, the influence of two of Kamehameha’s widows, Keapualani and Ka’ahumanu,
had convinced the new king Kamehameha II to end the kapu system. Although scholars
have advanced a variety of explanations for this decision - from Ka’ahumanu’s personal
annoyance at the gender discrimination inherent in kapu, to foreign influences, to the
desacralizing chaos brought by the western fleets, to an adaptive response to
depopulation - it is difficult to dispute that the timing proved fortuitous for the
missionaries.24
The end of the kapu system provided an opening for the missionaries, who wasted
little time trying to fill the vacuum with American ideas of social organization. While
they concerned themselves primarily with converting the native population, the
missionaries also brought many of the ideas that would coalesce in the northern United
States into what historians of the 1850s call “free labor ideology.” The missionaries
certainly subscribed to the explicitly Protestant notions of this worldview, which Eric
Foner identifies as the idea that labor was “a religious value, a Christian duty.” In their
work in Hawaii, the New Englanders accordingly proceeded under the related assumption
that, as Foner puts it, “the moral obligations which would ensure success in one’s calling
- honesty, frugality, diligence, punctuality, and sobriety - became religious obligations.”
They also shared “such basic assumptions as the value of economic individualism, the
rights of property, and other capitalist virtues.” The crucial difference between free labor

24 S. Lee Seaton, "The Hawaiian “kapu” Abolition o f 1819,” Am erican Ethnologist I, no. 1 (February,
1974), 202-204; Kuykendall, The H aw aiian Kingdom : Volume /, 67; Jennifer Fish Kashay, “From Kapus to
Christianity: The Disestablishm ent o f the Hawaiian Religion and Chiefly Appropriation o f Calvinist
Christianity,” The Western H istorical Q uarterly 39, n o.l (Spring, 2008), 17-39; V ow ell, 54-65; Seth
Archer, “Virgin Soil, Hawaiian Culture,” Paper presented at the Annual meeting o f the American Historical
Association, N ew York, January 2, 2015.
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ideology in Hawaii and on the mainland concerned what alternative system the free labor
system set itself up against. Foner’s observation that the “free labor outlook” offered not
only “a model of the good society” but also provided “a yardstick forjudging other social
systems” holds especially true in Hawaii as well.25
According to their leader Hiram Bingham, the missionaries arrived in Hawaii
hoping “to raise the character and change the religion and habits of the nation; to reform
and purify society there, and to found and build up institutions adapted to bless the
current and succeeding generations.”26 Among their other activities in the islands saving souls, creating a written version of the Hawaiian language, and counteracting the
profane influences of the whaling fleets - the missionaries sought to convince Hawaiians
to transform themselves into what the newcomers considered productive free laborers.
This meant undoing the legacy of the unfree, quasi-feudal labor system that had existed
before their arrival, and changing native behavior in ways consistent with the
missionaries’ vision of work. As Bingham put it, “the common people were accustomed
to spend less time and effort on the soil and fisheries” since some of their time “was
required on public plantations, or public buildings, or houses, or fences for landlords,
governors, kings, &c. This labor was often of little value... compared with the free
intelligent labor of enlightened communities.”27 He also described the construction of
Kawaiaha’o Church, an impressive structure built of large blocks of coral that native
divers cut from a nearby reef as a teaching exercise. “It was desirable” during the

25 Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology o f the Republican P arty before the C ivil War
(N ew York, 1995), 12-13,19
26 Hiram Bingham, A Residence o f Twenty-One Years in the Sandwich Islands, or, the Civil, Religious, and
P olitical H istory o f Those Islands: C om prising a P articular View o f the M issionary O perations C onnected
with the Introduction an d P rogress o f C hristianity an d C ivilization am ong the H awaiian p eo p le
(Canandaigua, N .Y ., 1855), 19.
27 Bingham, 570.
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construction process “that the hands of the natives should do as much of every part of the
work as, without much neglecting other duties, they could advantageously do in
procuring and fitting materials, and putting them in their proper place in the building. By
this means their knowledge of masonry and carpentry was materially augmented, and
their judgment improved, in respect to the business of life.”28
Missionaries also grumbled about the work ethic of their native laborers during
early attempts to cultivate sugar. In 1835, with the permission of King Kamehameha III,
a group of white missionary-businessmen leased 980 acres of royal land at Koloa on
Kauai to found a sugar plantation. The proprietors were impatient with their native
Hawaiian workers; co-owner William Hooper fretted that “it requires the concentrated
patience of an hundred Jobs to get along with these natives.” The temperance-minded
missionaries also worried that their molasses might be used in rum production.
Nonetheless, Koloa became the first profitable sugar plantation in Hawaii.29 Reflecting in
1844 on the missionaries’ influence in Hawaii, the journalist James Jackson Jarves
claimed that “even the King.. .satisfied that free labor is the most profitable, has, of late,
abolished the working days, and pays his workmen, who labor under the superintendence
of a white man, regular wages.”30 The missionaries brought from New England not only

28 Bingham, 572.
29 In 1825, Queen K a’ahumanu had revoked permission from a previous attempt to start a plantation at
Manoa when she discovered its connection to rum production. Hooper h im self fretted about the potential
violation o f his temperance principles to his colleagues, asking “Will not the M olasses which we have
forwarded P. & B. [Peirce & Brewer] be sent home and used for distillation? Ought w e not to make some
efforts to prevent that? H ow our reputation would suffer if any o f the m olasses shipped by us or through us
should be purchased by the distillers.” Arthur C. Alexander, K oloa Plantation 1835-1935: A Historyt o f the
O ldest H aw aiian Sugar Plantation (Honolulu, 1937), 10, 17; Benjamin Levy, National Register o f Historic
Places Inventory - Nomination Form: Old Sugar Mill o f Koloa (August, 1978).
http://pdfhost.focus.nps.gOv/docs/NHLS/Text/66000296.pdf, 3.
30 James Jackson Jarves, Scenes an d scen ery in the Sandwich Islands, an d a trip through Central America:
being observations fro m my n ote-book during the y e a rs 1837-1842 (Boston, 1844), 101.
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Christianity, but also an emphasis on free labor as an avenue to individual and collective
improvement.
In the first decades of the Congregationalist mission in Hawaii, white settlers
remained a relatively small presence in Hawaii, but their relationship with the Hawaiian
monarchy soon gave them outsized influence. In preparation for his plans to modernize
the Hawaiian government, King Kamehameha III poached the missionary William
Richards from the mission to serve as a tutor for the king and a small circle of Hawaiian
elites in political science. In 1839, Kamehameha issued a Declaration of Rights drafted
by one of these students, Boaz Mahune, which asserted that every man had rights to “life,
liberty, the labor of his hands, and productions of his mind,” and prohibited “service or
labor.. .at variance with the above sentiments.”31 This protection made its way into
Hawaii’s first constitution, ratified the following year.
Ominously, that constitution, which established a judiciary in a country with no
trained lawyers, allowed outsiders with a legal background to rise quickly to positions of
power. John Ricord, a New Jersey-born lawyer who had served as personal secretary to
Texas President Sam Houston, became Attorney General soon after his arrival in Hawaii.
William Little Lee, a New Yorker whom Ricord convinced to stay when Lee’s ship
stopped for repairs in Honolulu, became the first Chief Justice of the Hawaiian Supreme
Court. Together with his fellow New Yorker, the missionary Gerritt P. Judd, and the
native aristocrat John I’i, Justice Lee drafted the Hawaiian constitution of 1852.
This constitution was unequivocally antislavery. It pronounced that “slavery shall,
under no circumstances whatever, be tolerated in the Hawaiian Islands: whenever a slave
shall enter Hawaiian territory he shall be free.” The constitution did not define slavery.
31 Quoted in Kuykendall, The H aw aiian Kingdom, Volume II, 160.

The second half of the antislavery clause, however, suggested that its authors were
concerned more with the importation of chattel slaves than with the enslavement on
native Hawaiians. It stipulated that “no person who imports a slave, or slaves, into the
King’s dominions shall ever enjoy any civil or political rights in this realm.”32 In her
1962 examination of the 1854-1855 debates over American annexation of Hawaii, Merze
Tate suggests that annexation proposals failed in the 1850s because Hawaiians did not
want Hawaii to become the next Bleeding Kansas. While her evidence is vague - she
relies on the hostility toward Stephen Douglas that an American Commissioner in
Honolulu perceived in elite Hawaiian circles - the non-importation clause certainly fits
with her argument.33
Paradoxically, the political fruits of white influence appeared not only in the
official abolition of slavery, but also in laws that laid the foundation for the rise of sugar
plantation agriculture. The Oregon Treaty of 1846, American victory in the Mexican
War, which extended the boundaries of the United States to the Pacific Ocean, and
especially the California gold rush that began in 1848, all opened new possibilities for
sugar export to the United States. Under pressure from haole advisers, the king enacted a
series of laws which made large scale plantation agriculture possible. The “Great
Mahele” of 1848 transformed Hawaiian lands into commodities, creating an opening for
white ownership of large swaths of Hawaii. The subsequent Kuleana Act of 1850 allowed
commoners to apply for fee-simple ownership of lands they had customarily cultivated,

32 V ow ell, 159; Norman Meller, “M issionaries to Hawaii: Shapers o f the Islands’ Government,” The
Western P olitical Q uarterly 11, no. 4 (December, 1958), 792-793; Constitution and Laws o f His M ajesty
Kam eham eha III, K in g o f the H aw aiian Islands, P a ssed by the N obles an d Representatives at their
Sessions, 1852. (Honolulu, 1852), 4.
33 Merze Tate, “Slavery and Racism as Deterrents to the Annexation o f Hawaii, 1854-1855,” The Journal
o f N egro H istory 47, no. 1 (January, 1962), 6.
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but created a complex and burdensome process with a short application window. To
make matters worse, it passed one month after a law allowing foreign land ownership,
which well-connected white settlers quickly exploited.34 In the founding meeting of the
/ztfo/e-dominated Royal Hawaiian Agricultural Society in 1850, a circular letter
celebrated the fact that “the native government... impelled by the irresistible influence
and example of the Anglo Saxon energy and progress, which it sees in every direction, is
relaxing its former tenacious grasp on the arable lands of the Islands, and even inviting
and encouraging their cultivation by foreign skill and capital.”35
The interests of the Royal Hawaiian Agricultural Society, which would later
merge into the powerful Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association, appeared in labor
legislation as well as land legislation. William Little Lee, who would soon be Chief
Justice of Hawaii, drafted a “Masters and Servants Act,” which he submitted to the
Agricultural Society for approval on April 29, 1850 before formally proposing it to the
king. Much like labor laws in effect in Britain’s sugar-producing colonies in the post
emancipation period, the law involved the state in the discipline of contract laborers. It
allowed masters to apply to local law enforcement for arrest warrants on absconding
laborers, and permitted these masters to extend fugitives’ contracts for double the time of
their absence, up to one additional year. It also allowed masters to call on the police to
\

arrest their workers when they failed, in the master’s opinion, to serve in accordance with
their contract, and to have these workers imprisoned at hard labor until they agreed to
serve out the remainder of their contract. Finally, the law nodded to the possibility of

34 Sally Engle Merry, Colonizing H a w a i’i: The Cultural P ow er o f L aw (Princeton, 2000), 93-95; Jon M.
Van Dyke, Who Owns the Crown Lands o f H a w a i’i? (Honolulu, 2008), 39-51.
35 The Transactions o f the Royal H aw aiian A gricultural Society: Including a R ecord o f the P roceedings
Prelim inary to the F orm ation o f the Society, in August, 1850 I, no. 1 (Honolulu, 1850), 7.
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importing laborers from abroad by extending the maximum contract period - five years
for Hawaiians - to ten years for contracts made outside the islands.36 An 1860
amendment to the provision on fugitives strengthened penalties by requiring recaptured
workers to provide three months of hard labor for the state in addition to the extensions
on service to their master.37 One study of criminal cases in Hilo shows that twenty-three
percent of criminal cases involving Hawaiian defendants in 1863 were for work-related
offenses under the Masters and Servants Act. For defendants of all nationalities, workrelated offenses represented forty percent of all cases in 1873 and 37.7% of cases in
1883.38
In 1852, the same year that the Hawaiian constitution both forbade slavery and
imposed penalties on the importers of slaves, the first shipload of indentured Chinese
workers arrived to work under the legal regime of the Masters and Servants Act. John
Cass, a London ship captain already transporting Chinese migrants to San Francisco,
agreed to a contract with the Agricultural Society to bring 200 indentured Chinese
workers to Hawaii. On January 3, 1852, he returned with 195 migrants from Amoy
(modem Xiamen) aboard the Thetis?9 Sources from the 1850s differ on the conditions
these workers faced upon arrival in Hawaii. The missionary-run official government
newspaper, The Polynesian, claimed in July that “as the wages are not promised merely,

36 “An A ct for the Government o f Masters and Servants,” June 21, 1850, in Penal C ode o f the H awaiian
Islands, P a ssed by the H ouse o f N obles and R epresentatives on the 21s' o f June, A.D. 1850; to which are
A ppen ded the O ther A cts P assed by the House o f N obles and R epresentatives during their G eneral Session
f o r 1850 (Honolulu, 1850), 170-176.
37 Katharine Coman, The H istory o f C ontract Labor in the H awaiian Islands (N ew York, 1903), 493.
W ilma Sur, “H aw ai’i ’s Masters and Servants Act: Brutal Slavery?” U niversity o f H aw aii Law R eview 31,
no. 1 (Winter, 2008), 89-91
38 Merry, C olonizing Hawaii, 150-151, 171, Appendix B [n.p.].
39 Clarence E. Glick, Sojourners an d Settlers: Chinese M igrants in H aw aii (Honolulu, 1980), 6-7; Clarence
E. Glick, “The V oyage o f the ‘Thetis’ and the First Chinese Contract Laborers Brought to Hawaii,”
H aw aiian Journal o f H istory 9 (1975), 135-139; Tin-Yuke and Wai Jane Char, “The First Chinese Contract
Laborers in Hawaii, 1852,” H aw aiian Journal o f H istory 9 (1975), 128-134.
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but paid, and the coolies are well treated, they are not only content, but have urged their
friends at home to join them.”40 On the other hand, in an 1854 speech to the Agricultural
Society, Prince Liholiho, in a speech praising the importation of Chinese field hands,
casually mentioned that the indentured Chinese had “a considerable disposition to hang
themselves.”41 A missionary, William Speer, in emphasizing the civilizing influence of
Christianity on the workers, described them as “a turbulent, stubborn, reckless class
sometimes resisting overseers or employers, threatening to kill them or commit suicide...
Some of the whites treat them harshly, but generally Christians exhibit anxiety to deal
with them justly.”42 Whatever the fate of the migrants from the Thetis, during the 1850s
only a handful of additional indentured Chinese workers arrived in Hawaii.43
The 1860s marked a tipping point in Hawaii’s commercial integration with the
United States. Ballooning wartime demand for sugar in the United States, especially in
the midst of the disruption of the Louisiana sugar industry, raised prices high enough that
Hawaiian sugar became profitable in the American market despite steep tariffs. Between
1860 and 1865, the volume of Hawaiian sugar exports grew more than tenfold, from less
than 1.5 million pounds in 1860 to more than 15 million pounds in 1865 44 Westerners
already in Hawaii, including the missionaries themselves, were well-placed to take
advantage of the boom. Amos Starr Cooke, who had run the mission school that educated
40 The Polynesian, July 24, 1852, 42.
41 Prince Liholiho, “Report on Labor and Population,” in Transactions o f the Royal Hawaiian A gricultural
Society: A t Its Fourth Annual Meeting, in June, 1854 2, no. 1 (Honolulu, 1854), 103.
42 W illiam Speer to Walter Lowrie, May 2, 1856, quoted in Char and Char, 131. Scholars o f other societies
that imported indentured labor in the nineteenth century have found striking suicide rates among indentured
workers. Lisa Yun finds that Chinese indentured workers in Cuba in the 1850s had a suicide rate more than
ten times as high as Africans, and nearly one hundred times higher than whites. In the early twentieth
century, Hugh Tinker points to a suicide rate o f 780 per million among Indians in Fiji and 640 per million
among Indians in Natal, compared to 46-54 per m illion in India. See Lisa Yun, The Coolie Speaks: Chinese
Indentured L aborers an d African Slaves in Cuba (Philadelphia 2008), 84; Hugh Tinker, A N ew System o f
Slavery: The E xport o f Indian Labour O verseas 1830-1920 (London, 1974), 201.
43 Glick, Sojourners an d Settlers, 10.
44 Kuykendall, The H aw aiian Kingdom, Volume II, 141.
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the royal children, had partnered with the mission supply agent, Samuel N. Castle to form
i

a trading company in 1851. They had originally intended only to create an alternative
avenue to supplying the mission, since shipments from their superiors in Boston were
infrequent. During the Civil War, however, Castle & Cooke entered the sugar business,
which laid the foundations of their later growth into one of Hawaii’s “Big Five” sugar
companies. Another “Big Five” company, Alexander & Baldwin, also had roots in two
missionary families who seized the opportunities offered by the war to become sugar
merchants. Castle, Cooke, Alexander, and Baldwin joined with a handful of American
and European merchants to form the core of Hawaii’s planter class.
The rise of the sugar industry fueled debates over the appropriate type of labor for
the plantations. During and immediately after the American Civil War, debates over how
to correctly describe Hawaii’s labor system frequently hinged on how to define the term
“coolie.” As Moon-Ho Jung observes, “coolies were never a people or a legal category.
Rather, coolies were a conglomeration of racial imaginings that emerged worldwide in
the era of slave emancipation, a product of the imaginers rather than the imagined... in a
nation struggling to define slavery and freedom, coolies seemed to fall under neither yet
both; they were viewed as a natural advancement from chattel slavery and a means to
maintain slavery’s worst features.”45 The law Congress passed “to prohibit the ‘Coolie
trade’” in February 1862 reflected this inherent vagueness in its definition of the term. It
forbade American ships from transporting “the inhabitants or subjects of China, known as
‘coolies,’ to be transported to any foreign country, port, or place whatever, to be disposed
of, sold, or transferred, for any term of years or for any time whatever, as servants or

45 M oon-Ho Jung, C oolies an d Cane: Race, Labor, and Sugar in the A ge o f Em ancipation (Baltimore,
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apprentices, or to be held for service or labor.” It exempted from the ban “any free and
voluntary emigration of any Chinese subject.”46 While this definition seemed to indicate
clearly enough that “coolies” were specifically Chinese, its inclusion of the clause about
free and voluntary emigrations suggested that not all Chinese were coolies. On the other
hand, the fuzzy line between being “held for service of labor” and practicing “free and
voluntary emigration” opened the possibility that any migrant from China might be a
coolie. Andrew Gyory has pointed out that “the vagueness of the language eviscerated the
‘anti-coolie’ act of 1862,” and that “although Americans opposed to the importation of
Chinese frequently cited the law, it was virtually a dead letter from the day it passed.”47
Increasing trade intensified demands from Hawaii’s haole elite for labor, and
specifically for Hawaiian government subsidies for the importation of field hands. In
1864, two years after Congress passed the law banning the importation of coolies (which
the law defined as specifically Chinese), the Kingdom of Hawaii set up a Board of
Immigration to seek out foreign laborers and import them for plantation work. Through
appropriations from the Hawaiian treasury to pay recruitment costs, the Board of
Immigration, much like the Masters and Servants Act, enlisted the resources of the
Hawaiian state to serve the interests of sugar planters.48 The first agent of the Board of
Immigration to reach China, the German-born botanist William Hillebrand, received an
extra stipend from the Royal Hawaiian Agricultural Society, both to assist his recruitment
efforts and to allow him to collect “seeds, shrubs, plants, and animals” for commercial

46 “An A ct to prohibit the ‘C oolie Trade’ by American Citizens in American V essels,” February 19, 1862.
12 Stat. 340, Chapter XXVII.
47 Andrew Gyory, C losing the G ate: Race, Politics, an d the Chinese Exclusion A ct (Chapel Hill, 1998), 33.
48 “An Act to Provide for the Importation o f Laborers, and for the Encouragement o f Immigration,” in
“Laws o f the Hawaiian Islands: Session o f 1864.” Pacific C om m ercial A dvertiser, January 21, 1865, 4.
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use in Hawaii.49 By the summer of 1864, the Hillebrand and the Board began publishing
ads soliciting requests for coolies.50 One of these, published in the Pacific Commercial
Advertiser and the Hawaiian Gazette in 1865, assured readers that the importation
process could avoid abuses under the aegis of the state. “Whatever the disrepute and
odium attached to the Coolie trade in China, when conducted by private speculators may
be,” wrote future king David Kalakaua, “the case seems to be very different whenever it
is known that the business in in the hands and under the contract of a Government.”51 In
making this argument, Kalakaua echoed British officials who in 1842 had made the
imperial government itself responsible for the importation of indentured workers to
British colonies. The Hawaiian government seems to have believed, like Mauritius
Colonial Secretary G.F. Dick, that well-intentioned government involvement could
“obtain for the laborers most ample protection.”52
Despite these assurances, by the time serious discussion on proposals to lower
American tariffs on Hawaiian sugar began in 1867, a small but growing number of
Hawaiians and Americans had raised the possibility that Hawaii used a form of unfree
labor. It was probably no coincidence that a new Hawaiian constitution ratified in 1864
toned down its antislavery clause, removing the provision that had imposed penalties on
the importers of slaves.
The Board of Immigration continued recruitment efforts after 1865, but the slump
in sugar exports after the end of the Civil War encouraged the planter class and the
Hawaiian government to seek changes in Hawaii’s relationship to the United States. The
49 “Planter’s Society,” P acific Com m ercial A dvertiser, April 8, 1865, 2.
50 “N otice to Planters and Others Interested in the Importation o f Laborers,” P acific Com m ercial
A dvertiser, VIII, no. 50, June 11, 1864, 3.
51 “From the Gazette. B y Authority.” Pacific Com m ercial A dvertiser, July 29, 1865, 4.
52 Tinker, A N ew System o f Slavery, 75.
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Hawaiians convinced the American minister in Honolulu, Edward McCook, to propose a
“reciprocity” treaty with the United States, which would allow Hawaiian sugar to enter
the United States duty-free. Thanks to McCook’s lobbying, the proposed treaty, formally
introduced in the Senate in 1867, received more attention than similar proposals,
including support from Secretary of State Seward and President Johnson, but it fell by the
wayside in the midst of Johnson’s impeachment. By 1870, when the Senate finally
rejected the treaty, sugar exports were growing again, and the Board of Immigration was
expanding its search for labor beyond China.53
Even as late as Reconstruction, some white Hawaiians still felt that they had
something to teach American about emancipation. One of these, the Massachusetts
missionary and temperance activist Samuel C. Damon, edited the Honolulu newspaper
The Friend. On March 1, 1866, The Friend reviewed the consequences of three recent
emancipations around the world. The Friend that the emancipation of Russian serfs in
1861 had not only removed barriers to mobility and marriage, but had also enfranchised
the freed peasants to vote in local elections and granted them some property rights and
legal due process. In Hawaii itself, The Friend labeled the Great Mahele as “the
emancipation of the people” and “the transition from the old to the new order of things.”
Ignoring the dispossession of native Hawaiians, Damon pronounced that “the poor
kanaka may now stand on the border of his little kalo [taro] patch and, holding his fee
simple patent in his hand, bid defiance to the world!” Just months after the Thirteenth
Amendment, America needed to follow Hawaii’s lead and institute land reform in the
South. After 1848, “it was taken for granted [in Hawaii] that the tiller or cultivator of the
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soil had a right to own the land which he cultivated... This is just the point which, we
fear, has been over-looked in the emancipation of the slaves in the United States.”54
While no Congressman or Senator seems to have mentioned the issue of coolies
in Hawaii in the context of the first proposals for a United States-Hawaii reciprocity
treaty in 1867, Congress did make a statement relevant to the issue in the same year.55
The Senate - dominated by Radical Republicans after the 1866 midterm elections passed a resolution condemning the coolie trade on January 16. It declared that “the
traffic in laborers transported from China and other eastern countries [emphasis added],
known as the coolie trade, is odious to the people of the United States as inhuman and
immoral.” Placing the coolie trade in relation to African slavery, the resolution declared it
“abhorrent to the spirit of modem international law and policy, which have substantially
extirpated the African slave trade,” which the coolie trade differed from “in little else
than the employment of fraud instead of force to make its victims captive.” Building on
the 1862 Anti-Coolie Law, the Senate declared “preventing the further introduction of
coolies into this hemisphere, or the adjacent islands” [emphasis added] to be “the duty of
this government.”56
This resolution probably arose from concerns unconnected to Hawaii specifically.
As Moon-Ho Jung points out, the resolution originated with Nathaniel P. Banks, the
former Union commander in New Orleans and shaper of Reconstruction policies in
Louisiana, which links the statement more closely with the coolie trade in Cuba and
54 “Hawaii, Russia, America,” The Friend, March 1, 1866; Jocelyn Linnekin, “The Hui Lands o f Keanae:
Hawaiian Land Tenure and the Great M ahele,” The Journal o f the Polynesian Society 92, no. 2 (June,
1983), 169-188.
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Hawaiian Islands,” Decem ber 17, 1867. Exec Doc. F. 40-2-6, 129-147.
56 W illiam H. Seward, “Circular Relative to the C oolie Trade,” January 17, 1867
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Louisiana.57 The language of the resolution, however, made additions to the language of
the 1862 law - notably its mention of “other eastern countries” and “adjacent islands” that would make it directly relevant to Hawaii. Like the 1862 law, it also demonstrated a
sharp divergence between how the United States Congress and Hawaii’s influential
haoles, who had so recently crafted the Masters and Servants Act and the Board of
Immigration, understood the boundaries of “free labor.”
The year after the Senate issued this objection to the coolie trade, the American
officials had a reason to consider applying it to Hawaii. The collapse of the Tokugawa
shogunate in the Meiji Restoration of 1868 loosened long-standing Japanese restrictions
on emigration.58 Eugene Van Reed, an American businessman whom the Hawaiian
government had appointed its consul general in Japan, did not wait for the negotiation of
a formal treaty to move forward with the importation of plantation workers. According to
a complaint submitted to the American minister R.B. Van Valkenburgh by the Japanese
diplomats Hizen Fijio and Higashi Kuze Fijio, Van Reed had petitioned them to grant
passports to 350 Japanese subjects allowing them to travel to Hawaii for plantation work.
When the Japanese officials hesitated, insisting on allowing treaty negotiations to
proceed, the British ship Scioto abruptly sailed away with many of the workers on board.
In response Van Valkenburgh issued an order on May 29 extending the 1862 law to
include Japan, and applied to William Seward for a copy of the 1867 resolution to
support his position. Seward advised Van Valkenburgh that his actions were illegal, but
forwarded the resolution anyway, and referred the issue to the Senate Foreign Relations
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Committee.59 There is no evidence that Congress seriously considered either Van
Valkenburgh’s complaint or a reciprocity treaty in 1867. Van Valkenburgh’s amendment
during the Scioto incident had, after all, gone beyond the original 1862 legislation, which
had defined coolies as Chinese. Reports of the migrants’ mistreatment brought a
delegation of Japanese officials to Hawaii to protest and investigate. The passengers who
had been spirited away on the Scioto largely stayed in Hawaii, however; of the 148
workers transported on that ship, only 13 returned to Japan.60
The Scioto arrived in the midst of and contributed to a vigorous newspaper debate
within Hawaii over the definition and desirability of coolie labor. Henry Martyn Whitney,
a friend of Mark Twain, used his role as the editor of the Pacific Commercial Advertiser
to advance a sustained critique of the emerging coolie labor system in the 1860s. Whitney
often highlighted instances where specific aspects of the coolie experience seemed to
contradict their classification as “free labor.” For example, Whitney provided detailed
coverage of an 1867 court case In Re C.H. Lewers and Pakalo Chow, concerning the
applicability of tax laws to coolies. The worker, Pakalo Chow, protested that the Board of
Immigration had told him nothing about having to pay taxes. His employer, Lewers,
likewise protested that requiring coolies to work for the state to pay off taxes abridged the
contractual rights of employers, who had made contracts on the understanding that they
would have exclusive access to the labor of coolies during the period of their contract.
The government responded by asserting that coolies “were men, not slaves, neither could
a contract like the one in question be construed as reducing any man to a condition of
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slavery. These Chinamen were not chattels, but human beings, and they must be treated
as such,” taxes and all.61 When the court ruled in favor of the state and required the
payment of taxation, the Advertiser declared that the discrepancy between this
affirmation of coolies’ free status and their frustrating reality would only put planters and
workers at odds. “The laborer complains with reason,” it wrote, “that he has been
deceived... and may yet give trouble. The planter has to live in a constant state of
watchful precaution for the protection of life and property.”62
Four years after the kingdom’s influential Scottish-born foreign minister Robert
Crichton Wyllie died in 1865, Whitney pointed out the fate of the coolies at Princeville,
Wyllie’s Kauai sugar plantation. Not long after the Hawaiian government interred Wyllie
in the Royal Mausoleum, an honor rarely ever granted to non-royals, Whitney raised
questions about the validity of the contracts that bound Wyllie’s workers to Princeville.
These contracts, which allowed the executors of Wyllie’s will to reassign workers to new
masters, had yet to expire. Whitney pointed out the seeming violation of Hawaiian law,
which declared that “no contract of service shall bind the servant after the death of the
master.” The Advertiser stopped short of using the transferability of the workers to
explicitly label them as “slaves.” It did, however, suggest that the creators of these
contracts knew the laws “and defiantly determined to trample them under foot, as was the
[stridently antislavery] Constitution of 1852.”63
Whitney had offered a more detailed critique of the specific unfree characteristics
of coolie labor in the wake of the Scioto controversy. On their arrival in Honolulu, he
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alleged that coolies were “to all intents and purposes.. .regarded as a ‘chattel.’” Much like
slaves in a slave market, the most recent Chinese arrivals had been “marched to the
premises near the Custom-house, and confined within the yard, and a guard of soldiers
placed over them.” Planters visiting the yard had the right to choose which coolies they
desired for their plantations, while the coolies had no say in where they went. Whitney
claimed that a reporter with the Advertiser had boarded the British bark Eastfleld,
observed coolies chained by the hands and feet to a rail, and interviewed an officer who
said that shipboard discipline “would shock ‘the nerves of humanitarians and arouse their
sensibilities.’” In a broader sense, the Advertiser charged that the coolie system
encouraged the growth of a separate legal system for the workers, reminiscent of slave
codes in the American South. A society with a free labor, it explained, would not need
special provisions like Hawaii’s 1868 labor law, which allowed ministers to devise “such
rules and regulations as may be deemed necessary for the good government and control
of immigrants that have been brought... as servants or laborers.”64 Even if indentured
Asian laborers ostensibly arrived under voluntary contracts, their experience hardly
resembled free labor.
Moon-Ho Jung argues that “the perceived existence of coolieism and other forms
of bondage— and the moral imperative to prohibit slavery—infected and rationalized U.S.
expansionism abroad, from China and Cuba in the 1850s to the Philippines in the
1890s.”65 While this assessment may work in those instances, the newspaper debates
within Hawaii during the 1860s instead unfolded under the assumption that the presence
of “coolie labor” (if that was the correct description) would deter the United States from
64 “Bonded Laborers —The C oolie System ,” P acific C om m ercial A dvertiser XIII, no. 10, 2.
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greater entanglements with the islands. Soon after the United States registered its
displeasure at the Scioto's transportation of Japanese workers in 1868, the Pacific
Commercial Advertiser made these concerns explicit. Referring to a series of articles in
favor of importing contract laborers in the Hawaiian Gazette, the Advertiser claimed they
had “been written for the sole purpose of misleading foreign communities or
individuals.” Specifically, “it is the belief of many that the coolie system stands in the
way of the Reciprocity Treaty, and that it has been used by the opponents of the Treaty
abroad against the Government.”66
Whitney was right to see the American government as mostly hostile to the coolie
trade. He probably overstated the extent to which Americans saw the possibility of
coolie-based plantation agriculture in Hawaii as either immoral or contrary to increased
commercial activity between the two countries. In the midst of planter pressure to create
the Board of Immigration, the San Francisco business magazine Mercantile Gazette and
Prices Current urged the Hawaiian government to move forward with the importation of
coolies. The Gazette's argument acknowledged that certain versions of coolie labor
resembled slavery, but insisted that this was not the case for Hawaii. If anything, the
persistence of the trade under deadly conditions was evidence of its cost-effectiveness:
“If Coolie'labor can be profitably carried round the Cape of Good Hope to Cuba, a
passage, when made in winter, equal in its horrors and excessive mortality to the awful
middle passage of the slaves, it would seem unwise and suicidal to exclude it from
Hawaii whenever the extent of the plantations shall create a pressing want for it.”
Addressing humanitarian objections, the correspondent drew a firm line between
Hawaiian indentured labor and slavery: “to call it slavery and talk of the horrors of the
Saturday, September 5. Bonded Laborers - The Coolie System ,” Pacific C om m ercial A dvertiser
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passage to Hawaii is all cant. The Coolie works out his passage money and is free ever
after - apprentices do as much; and are not slaves; the passage from China to Honolulu is
as pleasant as any voyage in the world, and when the poor fellow gets there, his lot is
Paradise compared to life at home”67
Hawaii began importing coolies relatively late in comparison with Latin America,
Mauritius, and the British Empire, which used large numbers of Asian indentured
laborers relatively soon after abolishing slavery in 18 34.68 This meant that debates over
what it meant to import coolies into Hawaii had comparisons to draw on, both for
examples to follow and for cautionary tales of coolie importation gone wrong. Even
before large-scale Asian labor migration into Hawaii, newspapers on the mainland and in
the islands had carried stories about the coolie trade. In 1854, The Friend reported
favorably on the use of Chinese coolies in the construction of a railroad across Panama,
saying that “the coolies, after a few months, become steady, temperate, and industrious
workmen.”69 One reprint of the Austrian traveler Ida Pfeiffer’s account of the sugar
economy in Mauritius came with the optimistic caption, “With plenty of laborers, there is
no reason why some of our estates - such as the Princeville, the Haiku, and Makee might not produce 3,000,000 pounds or 1500 tons annually, as easily as those instanced
by Madame Pfeiffer.”70 Noting the permission that Tahiti and Martinique had granted for
the importation of coolies in 1864, the Pacific Commercial Advertiser, before it opposed
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the coolie trade, impatiently complained that “the government of those Islands has acted
with more promptness than ours to supply the growing scarcity of laborers.”71
Newspaper pieces praising the economic benefits of coolie labor coexisted with
lurid accounts of abuse and disaster. The Pacific Commercial Advertiser, for example,
ran a story in 1857 on the Dutch ship Banca, a coolie trade ship bound from Macau to
Havana, which had experienced a revolt by the migrants that resulted in a fire and
explosion in Macau, killing nearly everyone aboard.72 The Hawaiian Gazette recounted
the misfortunes of another ship, the Dolores Ugarte, which transported coolies from
Macau to the Peruvian port of Callao in 1870. A disease outbreak in the middle of the
Pacific led several of the workers to jump overboard rather than remain in the hold. As
food and water ran low, the crew stripped their passengers of what little money they had
by selling them cups of water. By the time the ship reached Peru, the Gazette's account
ran, the Dolores Ugarte had lost 270 of its original 608 passengers. Returning to Macau
the following year, the ship was destroyed by fire in the harbor, taking 600 coolies
trapped in the hold with it.73
The variety of information circulating about coolie labor around the world
allowed defenders of the institution to attribute abuses to a handful of bad actors, rather
than systemic problems. When a whaling crew brought news in 1863 that a Peruvian ship
had transported Marquesas Islanders to mine the guano deposits of the Chincha Islands,
the Pacific Commercial Advertiser had sharp criticism to offer. “It is simply a
continuation of the Chinese coolie slave trade,” the editors wrote, which “very naturally
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excites public indignation, and it becomes the powers of Europe to take such steps as may
put an end to it, if its character is as odious as has been represented.” The very same
article, however, offered a much more credulous interpretation of the labor recruitment
activities of a missionary ship, the Morning Star, in Micronesia. Pointing out that “the
system of importing voluntary laborers has been practiced in every country and in every
age,” the article concluded that “there can be no objection to it, when the terms are
distinctly and openly stated, and faithfully adhered to by each party,” and even hoped that
“it will result in social benefit to the laborers engaged, as the change of domicil [sic] will
tend to civilize them and their children.” Printing in full the labor contract provided by
the Morning Star's captain as evidence of his good intentions, the Advertiser regretted
only that the mission might distract from the ship’s original purpose - spreading the
gospel.74
A similar differentiation appeared in the response of the Hawaiian government’s
official newspaper, the Hawaiian Gazette, to the Scioto's 1868 transportation of Japanese
workers. Defending Eugene Van Reed’s actions in having these migrants spirited away
without permission, the Gazette acknowledged that coolies elsewhere were slaves in
many cases. “The transportation of this class of laborers from India and China to Cuba,
Peru, and other foreign countries,” it admitted, had “been attended with great cruelty.”
The process the Gazette described began in “opium and gambling houses” where
European ship captains duped “those overcome with stupor” to emigrate to places where
“they were sold to the highest bidder, who thenceforth treated them as slaves,” and kept
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them that way through debt peonage. The Scioto voyage was something quite different.
“These people well understood the conditions of the contract into which they had
entered,” and “went voluntarily away.”75
The Scioto incident nonetheless soured the Japanese government on the prospect
of allowing further emigration to Hawaii for almost twenty years. Although the
Hawaiian-Japanese treaty of 1871 in theory opened the door to this migration, Japanese
authorities generally declined to approve departures for Hawaii.76 Workers from China
continued to arrive in the 1870s, but the Hawaiian government stepped up its overseas
recruitment in the mid-1870s and funded commissioners to investigate new sources of
workers. William Hillebrand, the same German botanist who had traveled to China to
recruit labor in 1864, wrote to the Hawaiian government in 1876 from Madeira, arguing
that Portugal’s Atlantic sugar islands offered an ideal workforce for Hawaii. The
Hawaiian government reinstated him as an immigration commissioner, and a small
stream of field hands trickled from Madeira and the Azores to Hawaii with government
subsidies until 1888.77 The Board of Immigration also increased the resources it devoted
to recruitment in the South Pacific islands, which brought 2,500 workers to the sugar
plantations before it ended under pressure from local missionaries and the British
commissioner in Honolulu, James Hay Wodehouse. British pressure had the same effect
on Hawaiian plans to import workers from British India, which Hawaiian officials ruled
out once it became clear that this would require vetting from an official “protector of

75 “Japanese for Hawaii,” H aw aiian G azette IV, no. 39, October 14, 1868, 2.
76 Kuykendall, The H aw aiian Kingdom, Volume III, 154.
77 Kuykendall, The H awaiian Kingdom, Volume III, 122-126.

33
immigrants” approved by the British.78 Finally, private Hawaiian companies investigated
the possibility of recruiting northern Europeans, bringing hundreds of Norwegians and
more than 1,300 Germans in the early 1880s.79
These experiments in subsidized labor importation raised questions of resource
allocation that had preoccupied Hawaii’s planters since the creation of the Board of
Immigration in 1864. If the Hawaiian government was going to devote funds to finding
plantation laborers, where in the world should it look? The conflation of “unfree” status
and nonwhite racial identity inherent in the term “coolie” led to proposals to recruit
European agricultural workers, based on the assumption that only they could make ideal
free laborers. Whether these ideas were intended as serious blueprints for policy, or
whether they were a rhetorical device designed to paint opponents as supporters of unfree
labor, they point to an ideological climate deeply suspicious of Asian laborers. A letter to
the editor of the Pacific Commercial Advertiser, for example, claimed in 1860 that
Hawaii’s pleasant weather could allow independent white farmers to flourish in Hawaii’s
sugar industry. “These islands are so much blessed with a salubrious and favorable
climate, that the white man is enabled, without detriment to health and constitution, to
produce all those articles which in other countries can only be produced by the labor of
the African race.” The column framed the issue not only in terms of competition between
free and unfree labor systems, but also in light of the national survival of a kingdom in
the midst of demographic crisis: “the only alternative left to the country is, either ‘a free
nation and a free people derived from encouraged immigration, or annexation and
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slavery.’” Although the correspondent claimed that “it is small farmers that we want,” the
letter imagined these “small” white farmers as employers and civilizational tutors for
native Hawaiians. Far from making Hawaiians unfree laborers, such an arrangement
would inculcate free labor values into the Hawaiian population. “By regulating their labor
to certain hours, prohibiting idling at working time,” the argument went, “one of the
greatest wants in native character is supplied - order.”80
Racially inflected calls for European immigration reappeared during negotiations
over a proposed reciprocity treaty in 1867. Henry Martyn Whitney’s condemnation of
coolie labor on antislavery grounds overlapped with a racist worldview that conflated the
eligibility to be a “free” laborer with racial status. “The one race above all others that
recommends itself to us for the requisite qualities of intelligence, plodding industry and
thrift,” he editorialized, “is the German.” Whitney did not entirely abandon the stated
belief of the early missionaries that civilized habits could provide an example that could
enlighten previously benighted peoples. After all, the ultimate goal of bringing workers
was that the native Hawaiians “be aided in their upward struggle to civilization and
enlightenment” by ensuring that “under the busy untiring hands of human industry” a
“useless wilderness...is enhanced and improved, her useful is developed.” The
civilizational hierarchy behind Whitney’s preference for Europeans, however, offered a
vision of labor habits that was so immutable as to be racial rather than cultural. It was
better to pay the higher transportation costs for Germans, he suggested, “instead of
seeking [laborers] among the barbarous and pagan idolators of Asia, who are incapable of
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Christian civilization and never will assimilate or amalgamate with either the Hawaiian or
the Caucasian races.”81
Among white elites in Hawaii itself, the continued presence and power of native
Hawaiians added a dimension to racial constructions of Asian migrants as “coolies” not
present elsewhere. Many immigration proposals in the Hawaiian press came packaged as
strategies for reversing the demographic decline of native Hawaiians as a way of
reassuring natives, who became increasingly skeptical of plans to bring more foreigners
to Hawaii as they become a progressively smaller demographic presence. The Pacific
Commercial Advertiser paired an 1861 call for European immigrants with a suggestion
that “some law of the nature of a Homestead Act, granting... to any married Hawaiian
female, who has reared five children to the age of ten years and upwards, a bounty of a
A

certain number of acres of land.”82 In 1868, an even less probable suggestion appeared in
a pseudonymous letter in the Advertiser, which called for allowing native Hawaiians to
adopt children freely from the orphanages of Europe. “Bringing Chinamen, &c., will
never repopulate Hawaii,” it argued, and “what is wanted is a class that will amalgamate
with the native, or take his place when he is gone; a class that instead of dying out will
increase and multiply.”83
The editors shrugged the letter off as worthy of “attention, for originality, if
nothing else,” but the piece exemplified a rhetorical posture within immigration debates
that called for “cognate races” capable of assimilating themselves into and replenishing
native Hawaiian society.84 The only thing unusual about the 1868 orphan proposal had
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been that it applied the language to whites. Other Polynesians were a far more common
object of this rhetoric. The pro-government Hawaiian Gazette, for example, noted in the
context of proposals to import Swedes that “the transplacing of Polynesians” would
represent “the introduction of a cognate and kindred race from the Islands west of us, of a
healthy and vigorous stock” and “would seem the easiest and wisest means of
accomplishing the re-invigoration of our own people.”85
This conception of “cognate race” enjoyed notable support among native
Hawaiians. A series of native Hawaiian mass meetings in October 1869 approved the
idea of Polynesian immigration at the same time that they denounced the planters and
their coolie workers as usurpers of Hawaiian sovereignty. Large numbers of attendees
walked out during speeches by Judge S.W. Mahelona and J.W. Kalua in favor of Chinese
immigration, and those who remained booed Kalua off the stage with shouts .of “down
with the traitor.” More popular speakers claimed that the planters “wanted slaves, in
order to get more money,” and that imported Chinese workers were “murderers, thieves,
and robbers.” In the end, resolutions passed in the meetings not only asserted opposition
to Chinese immigration and “that the government should bring here the people... of a
cognate race with ourselves, as laborers, and to increase the population of our group,” but
also condemned the penal provisions of the Masters and Servants Act as a root cause of
these protests.86 However, since ideas of racial difference were endlessly malleable, the
concept of “cognate race” could be employed to different ends in different hands. In
1876, years after the end of Henry M. Whitney’s tenure had also ended the paper’s anti
coolie trade crusade, the Pacific Commercial Advertiser conveniently identified East
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Indians and Hawaiians as “cognate races” that could assimilate based on “their tractable
natures and plodding habits of industry.”87
Political developments between the 1870s solidified planter power and intensified
debates over potential sources of migrants. After the Kamehameha dynasty had died out
with King Kamehameha V in 1872, the Hawaiian monarchy began to suffer a crisis of
legitimacy that left it increasingly vulnerable to planter machinations. The Constitution
provided that the legislature would elect successors. The election that brought King
Kalakaua to power in 1874 saw widespread protests by backers of his opponent, Queen
Emma, that started his reign on a foul note.
Meanwhile, Hawaii and the United States ratified a reciprocity treaty in 1875 that
went into effect in 1876. The treaty allowed Hawaiian sugar and a variety of American
products to move between the countries duty-free, and allowed the United States to
establish a naval base at Pearl Harbor. The end of American tariff barriers caused an
explosive expansion of the sugar industry. Sugar exports rise from 26 million pounds in
1876 to more than 216 million pounds in 1886, accelerated the rising influence of haole
planter elites.88 These changes emboldened planters, who demanded and received a new
migration treaty, the Hawaiian-Japanese Labor Convention of 1886, which opened the
door to large scale importation of Japanese workers. This did not stop the planters’ moves
to subvert the monarchy. The king’s reliance on the eccentric Walter Murray Gibson,
corrupt dealings involving the German-American sugar magnate Claus Spreckels, and
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perceived extravagance emboldened anti-monarchist haoles. In 1887, menaced by the
fast-growing all-white militia company, the Honolulu Rifles, the king agreed to a new
constitution that significantly limited his power. This “Bayonet Constitution,” as it was
called, convinced Gibson to flee the country and foreshadowed the coup that ended the
Hawaiian monarchy in 1893.89
The idea of “cognate races” had an especially powerful supporter in King
Kalakaua’s mercurial adviser Walter Murray Gibson. Gibson’s early travels in the Pacific
in the 1850s had ended when the colonial government in the Dutch East Indies
imprisoned him on charges of fomenting rebellion in Sumatra. In his romanticized
account of his adventures, The Prison ofWeltevreden, which he published after escaping
and returning to America, Gibson presented himself as a friend of “the Malay race,”
whose members he described as exhibiting “many evidences of a refined and tasteful
civilization, of a happy disposition to receive the truths of a more convincing creed than
their own, and a simplicity of character, and a heroism of devotion.”90 After converting to
Mormonism and convincing Brigham Young to send him on a mission to find potential
settlement locations for the Mormons in the Pacific, Gibson made himself leader of the
Mormon settlement on Lanai. Gibson’s behavior in Lanai led to his excommunication
from the LDS church, which grew suspicious when he used donations from local
Mormons to purchase land on Lanai in his own name. Regardless of the motives behind
his land purchases, the departure of the Mormons from Lanai left Gibson in control of
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most of the island. By the 1880s, Gibson had used the wealth from his Lanai cattle ranch
to enter Hawaiian politics, and had become King Kalakaua’s most prominent adviser.91
Gibson never lost his fascination with the inhabitants of Malaya and Indonesia,
whom he saw as a perfect cognate race for Hawaiians.92 In November 1886, he noted
with glee in his diary, “The King very genial - enthusiastic about immigration of
Javanese.” 93 The Cabinet Council also granted him the authority to correspond with his
former Dutch antagonists about sending laborers from the Dutch East Indies to Hawaii.
Nothing became of this correspondence. In his role as Minister of Foreign Affairs,
however, Gibson presided over the Hawaiian-Japanese Labor Convention of 1886, which
ended the eighteen years of chilly relations on labor migrations that began with the Scioto
incident. In this context, he simply transferred the mantel of “cognate race” to the
Japanese. Gibson instructed the Hawaiian envoy to Japan, John M. Kapena, to suggest to
the emperor that “to strengthen [King Kalakaua’s] hands is to elevate the sovereign of a
cognate and friendly race.” Kapena echoed this idea at a government dinner in Tokyo,
where he addressed Japanese officials saying “[Kalakaua] believes that the Japanese and
Hawaiians spring from one cognate race, and this enhances his love for you.”94 These
negotiations ultimately paved the way for Japanese migration to Hawaii on an
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unprecedented scale, and the Japanese workers admitted under the Labor Convention
became the core of the plantation workforce.95
These events, which marked the beginning of the end for Hawaiian
independence, had parallel consequences in Hawaiian racial politics and migration
policy. They marked a definitive turn away from the free labor ideals that had infused
debates over coolie labor in the 1860s. The 1887 constitution dropped the pretense of
equality for Asian labor migrants, and limited suffrage to males of European, American,
or Hawaiian descent who possessed at least three thousand dollars in taxable property.
This represented a dramatic and significant break with the past. The pro-government
writers who had tried to rebut Henry Martyn Whitney’s critiques of coolie labor in the
1860s had insisted that all people, even coolies, were subject to the same laws in Hawaii.
Now, Hawaii was unabashedly a planters’ society, without the fa9ade of legal equality.
Seen in this light, the Hawaiian-Japanese Labor Convention of 1886 was a central
element in consolidating planter control.
The transformations in Hawaiian labor migration of the 1880s occurred in the
context of the implementation of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 in the United States.
Calls for restriction or exclusion had become a major political issue in the United States
in the 1870s. The 1882 law had been made possible through an 1880 revision of the SinoAmerican Burlingame Treaty, which allowed the U.S. to suspend the admission of
Chinese laborers. Scholars disagree when it comes to identifying the single most
important explanation for this law, but it clearly drew on a combination of racism,
support from the labor movement, pressure from white Californians, political
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opportunism, and anxieties about unfree labor.96 These concerns bled over into a parallel
debate within Hawaii.
Before the 1880s, the notion that the islands were experiencing a “labor shortage”
was rarely scrutinized. In the early 1880s, however, a significant increase in Chinese
arrivals encouraged the growth of a movement for restrictions on Chinese immigration
among white and native Hawaiians. When it began to implement some of these
restrictions, the government cited disruptions in the normal flow of Chinese migrants to
Hawaii. The passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act in the United States brought at least
two unexpected shiploads of Chinese laborers from San Francisco in 1882. At the same
time, a smallpox outbreak in Chinese ports in 1883 prompted the Hawaiian government
to ask the British to suspend migration from Canton and Hong Kong.97
The Gibson administration imposed new regulations beginning in 1883, which
sharply reduced the number of permissions granted to land Chinese workers. After 1886,
no Chinese worker could enter Hawaii without a passport, and just before the overthrow
of the monarchy, the Hawaiian legislature passed “An Act Restricting Chinese
Immigration” in 1892, which drastically reduced the number of arrivals allowed. The
nearly simultaneous enactment of Chinese restriction and Japanese immigration
alleviated disruptions in labor supply for planters.98 In 1883, Gibson wrote to
representatives to the United Chinese Society explaining the government’s increasing
tendency to impose special restrictions of Chinese migrants. He assured them that “the
Government is desirous to place all immigrants on the same footing.” Chinese migrants
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needed to be restricted, however, “in view of their all coming from ports infected by
diseases... also in view of the fact that the ordinary immigration from China consists
almost wholly of males.”99
The motivation for Chinese exclusion went beyond these pretexts. The exclusion
movement drew on the same racialized understandings of who could and could not be an
ideal free laborer that had informed debates over which types of immigrants were worth
bringing to Hawaii. They also echoed anti-Chinese rhetoric familiar on the mainland.
These understandings made the ideal of “free labor” less a universal goal applicable to all
peoples than a prerogative of whites (and often in this context, native Hawaiians) to be
asserted against threats from the Chinese. In an 1885 anti-Chinese screed, The Daily
Bulletin of Honolulu blamed in part “a Hawaiian labor contract system which has been a
bone of contention for several years and the direct cause of expelling nearly the whole of
the Anglo-Saxon laborers from our soil.” The Bulletin's solution, “a free labor system,”
would replace contract labor with a form of sharecropping. This arrangement would
make it so that “hundreds of Chinese laborers or coolies now lying about the kingdom,
encouraged in their idleness... would be obliged to work in our cane fields” rather than
starting stores that competed unscrupulously with white and Hawaiian businessmen.100
As Charles Patterson, a Honolulu house painter in another column, “Can a white man
compete with a Chinaman? I say most emphatically, no, he cannot; living as they do in
filth and pestilence, huddled together like so many sheep, disregarding the sanitary laws
of the country, and living on five or ten cents’ worth of rice a day.” As for white
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aspirations to “live, as you ought to live, a Christian life. I say no; you cannot compete
with John Chinaman and do these things.”101
Although Hawaiian planters shifted from Chinese to Japanese labor in the 1880s,
fears about “Asiatic” threats to honest labor persisted. Samuel Gompers dramatized this
attitude with his question, “Meat vs. Rice - American Manhood vs. Asiatic Coolieism.
Which Shall Survive?” A variety of mainland observers noted the threat to honest
industry they perceived from coolie labor in Hawaii. Louisiana Congressman J. Floyd
King spoke for many others with interests in the Louisiana sugar industry when he
protested the continuation of Hawaiian reciprocity in 1886. “After spending untold
millions to free the slaves in the South,” he argued the government “was maintaining a
system of coolie labor in the Sandwich Islands akin to slavery.”102 The rise of agrarian
political movements in the late nineteenth century sometimes infused suspicions of
conspiracies against simple farmers into discussions of Hawaii’s labor system. On May 6,
1897, Ranche [sic] and Range, an agricultural journal of the Pacific Northwest,
condemned the “so-called reciprocity treaty,” saying it “retarded and crushed for the
benefit of a few millionaires and their coolie laborers” the honest exertions of white
farmers on the mainland by undermining their experiments with sugar beets.103 Two
years later, after annexation, the populist Kansas Agitator made a similar warning about
the threat Hawaiian coolie labor posed to American farmers. “As between the sugar trust
and coolie labor on the one hand, and the interests of our American farmer on the other,”
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the Agitator asked, “who can doubt the final result?”104 Although the editors seemed to
conflate the Sugar Trust of east coast refiners with its Hawaiian competitors, the point
was clear: “the American farmers and their hired men do not yet recognize the extent of
this unfair competition... they have got to wake up to their interests or the coolie slave
system will be extended.”105
The period between white settlers’ creation of the Republic of Hawaii after
overthrowing the monarchy in 1893 and U.S. annexation in 1898 saw continued
importation of indentured labor. At the same time, it became increasingly clear that U.S.
annexation could mean the end of contract labor importation. Travelling to Hawaii to
compile a report on the 1893 coup, Georgia Senator James H. Blount found planters
anxious about the future of contract labor in the event of annexation. From conversations
with H.P. Baldwin and William Blaisdell, he learned that planters considered contract
labor indispensable, and that some opposed annexation on those grounds.106 Other
planters seem to have been more optimistic. When Blount asked Claus Spreckels if he
thought the planters could evade U.S. labor laws, Spreckels responded that “my opinion
is that they can not [sic], but they think they can get around the United States laws.”
Others, including Sanford Dole, thought that even if annexation ended contract labor, the
planters could have a close substitute. Recalling a private meeting with Dole on labor
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issues, Spreckels quoted the president as saying “I have belief that the United States will
give us a separate law that we can get laborers here.” 107
Unsurprisingly, given domestic opinion and previous American laws, Congress
repealed Hawaii’s contract labor laws when they passed the Hawaiian Organic Act in
1900, which established the Hawaii territorial government two years after annexation.
The law not only ended the coolie system in the specific form it had taken under the
Masters and Servants Act and the Board of Immigration, but also reintegrated Hawaii
into the American understanding of what “free labor” meant eighty years after New
England missionaries left Boston with their own definition. “This is now American
territory and it must conform to American civilization and American law,” announced the
Honolulu Republican, “and any form of human slavery is against American law, and all
contract labor where parties are bound for a term of years and brought here from distant
lands is but another name for coolieism, which amounts to slavery.” 108
In a way, debates over free labor in America and Hawaii had come full circle. The
missionaries who had remolded Hawaii society beginning in 1820 had brought a vision of
“free labor” fully consistent with an American worldview. The planter class that
developed in part out of the mission believed themselves to be continuing this
commitment to free labor. Their definition, ironically, facilitated the creation of a
plantation system based on sugar cultivation through land and labor legislation that
empowered planters. As critics pointed out, their definition also accommodated the
importation of “coolie” labor, a practice that many observers could not distinguish from
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slavery. Moves toward Chinese exclusion intersected with concerns about unfree labor,
but did not result in the abolition of contract labor importation until 1900. Transplanted
Americans had laid the foundations for contract labor in Hawaii under the banner of free
labor; now, the American government abolished it on the same grounds.
This need to reconcile American and Hawaiian versions of acceptable labor
practices did not mean that the differences between two had been developing entirely
independently. Since the 1850s and even earlier, “free labor” had been a malleable and
transnational concept, defined in Hawaii with reference to both Hawaiian and American
contexts. In limited ways, free labor ideology had served as a counterweight to the rise of
unfree labor in the form of the coolie trade. For the most part, however, the rise of
contracted Asian plantation labor in nineteenth century Hawaii occurred with the aid of a
vision of free labor that did not stand in the way of the sugar planters.
In one sense, the abolition of contract labor in Hawaii though American
annexation marked a sort of emancipation. For several days after June 14, 1900 (the day
the Organic Act became effective), Japanese workers emboldened by the change in the
law and uncertain of the future stopped working on plantations across Hawaii.109 In the
long run, however, most workers stayed on the plantations, and planter control of Hawaii
remained largely intact until the mid-twentieth century. Hawaiian planters may have lost
contract labor, but as JoAnna Poblete has recently shown, annexation gave them access to
new sources of labor from the Philippines and Puerto Rico, areas whose residents fell

109 “Plantation Laborers Incited by Agitators,” P acific C om m ercial A dvertiser XX XL, no. 5576, 6;
“Japanese Strike on Plantations,” The Honolulu Republican I, no. 10 (June 24, 1900), 1.
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under the unenfranchised category of “U.S. colonial.” 110 The meaning of “free labor” was
never clear-cut in the nineteenth century, and that did not change in the twentieth.

110 JoAnna Poblete, Islanders in the Em pire: Filipino and Puerto Rican Laborers in H a w a i’i (Urbana, 111.,
2014).
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